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INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary legal analysis of how States may respond to hostile cyber 
activities has generally ignored the option of countermeasures, focusing 
instead on responses grounded in the law of self-defense. A customary law 
paradigm reflected in Article 51 of the UN Charter, the right of self-
defense, permits States to respond forcefully to “armed attacks,” including 
cyber operations qualifying as such.1 This self-defense centric analytical 
framework reflects State fears of a possible “cyber 9/11” in which another 
State or a transnational terrorist group mounts a cyber operation produc-
ing devastating human, physical, or economic consequences. 
Yet, preoccupation with cyber armed attacks is counter-experiential. 
Few, if any, cyber operations have crossed the armed attack threshold.2 By 
contrast, malicious cyber operations below that level are commonplace.3 
For instance, Chinese hackers have penetrated powerful financial institu-
tions like Morgan Stanley and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,4 as well as 
such influential media outlets as the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, 
and Washington Post. 5  Reportedly, the Chinese government also hires 
contractors to conduct cyber operations, a prominent example being the 
“Comment Crew,” which has breached the passive defenses of U.S. de-
                                                          
1. U.N. Charter art. 51. An “armed attack” is the textual condition precedent set forth in Article 
51 for the exercise of the right of self-defense. On the customary nature of the right of self-defense, 
see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) (Nicaragua), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 176 (June 27); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Weapons), Advi-
sory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶¶ 38, 41 (July 8); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 74 
(Nov. 6). As to self-defense in the cyber context, see TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE rules 13–17 and accompanying commentary (Michael N. 
Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL]; Matthew C. Waxman, Self-defensive Force Against 
Cyber Attacks: Legal, Strategic and Political Dimensions, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 109 (2013); Michael N. Schmitt, 
Cyber Operations and the Jus ad Bellum Revisited, 56 VILL. L. REV. 569, 586–603 (2011); Yoram 
Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 99 (2002).  
2. For instance, disagreement even exists as to whether the 2010 Stuxnet operation against the 
Iranian nuclear program, which damaged over 1000 centrifuges, qualified as an armed attack. See, e.g., 
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 1, at 58. Even if the operation rose to that level, the question remains 
as to whether Israel and the United States enjoyed the right to act in anticipatory individual and col-
lective self-defense (assuming for the sake of analysis that they were the authors of the operation). 
3. For an excellent survey of the sources and techniques used to conduct such attacks, see 
KENNETH GEERS ET AL., FIREEYE LABS, WORLD WAR C: UNDERSTANDING NATION-STATE 
MOTIVES BEHIND TODAY’S ADVANCED CYBER ATTACKS (2013). 
4. Siobhan Gorman, China Hackers Hit U.S. Chamber, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2011, http://online. 
wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204058404577110541568535300; Michael Joseph Gross, 
Enter the Cyber-Dragon, VANITY FAIR, Sept. 2011, http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/ 
09/chinese-hacking-201109. 
5. Nicole Perlroth, Washington Post Joins List of News Media Hacked by the Chinese, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
1, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/02/technology/washington-posts-joins-list-of-media-ha 
cked-by-the-chinese.html; Nicole Perlroth, Wall Street Journal Announces That it, Too, Was Hacked by the 
Chinese, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/01/technology/wall-street-jo 
urnal-reports-attack-by-china-hackers.html. 
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fense industries.6 North Korea appears to have developed a large cyber 
operations department,7 India and Pakistan have engaged in nondestruc-
tive cyber exchanges,8 and the Syrian Electronic Army has conducted dis-
ruptive operations against media and human rights groups it styles as anti-
Assad, like Al-Jazeera, the BBC, National Public Radio, Human Rights 
Watch, and Anonymous.9 Perhaps most significantly, U.S. Cyber Com-
mand possesses unparalleled capabilities to conduct operations below the 
armed attack threshold. 
This Article examines how and when States may employ countermeas-
ures in response to malicious cyber operations that fail to qualify as armed 
attacks.10 The analysis applies equally to the use of cyber countermeasures 
against non-cyber activities.11 After discussing the nature of countermeas-
ures, the Article sets out the conditions precedent to taking them in Part 
II. In Part III, the Article dissects the requirements and restrictions im-
posed on countermeasures as they apply in the cyber context. The Article 
concludes that countermeasures can prove an effective response option 
for States facing harmful cyber operations, but that due to various limita-
tions on their use, they are no panacea. Highlighting their availability will 
nevertheless hopefully dampen the destabilizing incentive States have to 
                                                          
6. David E. Sanger, David Barboza & Nicole Perlroth, Chinese Army Unit is Seen as Tied to Hacking 
Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-
army-is-seen-as-tied-to-hacking-against-us.html?pagewanted=all; Michael Riley & Dune Lawrence, 
Hackers Linked to China’s Army Seen from EU to D.C., BLOOMBERG (July 26, 2012, 7:00 PM), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-26/china-hackers-hit-eu-point-man-and-d-c-with-byzantine-ca 
ndor.html. A 2012 Department of Defense report to Congress summarized the situation by asserting 
that “computer systems around the world, including those owned by the U.S. government, continue[] 
to be targeted for intrusions, some of which appear to be attributable directly to the Chinese gov-
ernment and military.” OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY 
AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 36 (2013), availa-
ble at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf. 
7. Max Fisher, South Korea Under Cyber Attack: Is North Korea Secretly Awesome at Hacking?, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 20, 2013, 11:45 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/ 
03/20/south-korea-under-cyber-attack-is-north-korea-secretly-awesome-at-hacking/. 
8. India and Pakistan in Cyber War, AL-JAZEERA (Dec. 4, 2010, 16:38 GMT), http://www.aljazeera. 
com/news/asia/2010/12/20101241373583977.html. 
9. Max Fisher & Jared Keller, Syria’s Digital Counter-Revolutionaries, ATLANTIC (Aug. 31, 2011, 
12:41 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/08/syrias-digital-counter-revolu 
tionaries/244382/; Hayley Tsukayama & Paul Farhi, Syrian Hackers Claim Responsibility for Disrupting 
Twitter, New York Times Web Site, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2013, 8:44 AM), http://www.washington 
post.com/lifestyle/style/syrian-hackers-claim-responsibility-for-hacking-twitter-new-york-times-web-
site/2013/08/27/20500f58-0f5c-11e3-bdf6-e4fc677d94a1_story.html. 
10. This Article does not address the issue of where the armed attack threshold lies. On that sub-
ject, see TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 1, rule 13 and accompanying commentary. 
11. Attention is slowly beginning to focus on this issue in the context of cyber operations. See, 
e.g., Jan E. Messerschmidt, Hackback: Permitting Retaliatory Hacking by Non-State Actors as Proportionate 
Countermeasures to Transboundary Cyberharm, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 275 (2013). 
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characterize cyber operations as armed attacks, if only to afford themselves 
a legal basis upon which to ground effective responses.12 
I. COUNTERMEASURES GENERALLY 
A. Countermeasures Defined 
States bear “responsibility” for their internationally wrongful acts pur-
suant to the law of State responsibility.13 The International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) has confirmed this principle on many occasions.14 It is the founda-
tion upon which the authoritative, albeit nonbinding, Draft Articles on Re-
sponsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Articles on State Respon-
sibility) have been constructed.15 The law of State responsibility undeniably 
extends to cyber activities.16  
A remedial measure situated in the law of State responsibility, counter-
measures are State actions, or omissions, directed at another State that 
would otherwise violate an obligation owed to that State and that are con-
ducted by the former in order to compel or convince the latter to desist in 
its own internationally wrongful acts or omissions. They constitute a 
                                                          
12. This Article does not address the issue of the responsibility of international organizations. On 
that matter, see Int'l L. Comm'n, Responsibility of International Organizations, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.778 (May 30, 2011).  
13. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 1, G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility].  
14. See, e.g., Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 9); Nicaragua, 1896 I.C.J. 14, 
¶¶ 283, 292; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 47 (Sept. 25). The Per-
manent Court of International Justice enunciated the same principle earlier. See, e.g., Phosphates in 
Morocco (It. v. Fr.), Preliminary Objections, 1938 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 74, at 10, 28 (June 14); S.S. 
Wimbledom (U.K., Fr., It. & Japan v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J (ser. A) No. 1, at 15, 30 (Aug. 17); Factory 
at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 3, 29–30 (July 26). 
15. The Articles on State Responsibility are not a treaty and therefore are nonbinding. However, 
they are authoritative in the sense that the International Law Commission (ILC) developed them 
during a process that took over half a century under the leadership of five special rapporteurs. Once 
completed, the United Nations General Assembly commended the Articles to governments. Articles 
on State Responsibility, supra note 13, ¶ 3. Today, they are generally, albeit not entirely, characterized 
as reflecting customary international law. By 2012, the Articles and the accompanying commentary 
had been cited 154 times by international courts, tribunals, and other bodies. 25 UNITED NATIONS 
LEGISLATIVE SERIES: MATERIALS ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY 
WRONGFUL ACTS, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/25 (2012). Prior to adoption of the Articles by the 
ILC, the United States stated “[w]hile we welcome the recognition that countermeasures play an 
important role in the regime of state responsibility, we believe that the draft articles contain unsup-
ported restrictions on their use.” United States: Comments on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 37 
I.L.M. 468, 468 (1998). It did not expound on its objections. For an analysis of the congruency of the 
Articles’ approach to countermeasures with the extant law at the time of their adoption, see David J. 
Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 817 (2002). 
16. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 1, rule 6. On sovereignty, see id. rule 1 and accompanying 
commentary. 
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means of self-help in an international system generally devoid of compul-
sory dispute resolution mechanisms. In that countermeasures contemplate 
actions that would otherwise be unlawful, international law places strict 
restriction on their use. These restrictions address their purpose, relation-
ship with other legal rights and duties, means and scope of execution, orig-
inators, and targets. Both the ICJ and arbitral tribunals have recognized 
countermeasures.17 
B. Countermeasures Distinguished 
In the first half of the last century, countermeasures were titled “peace-
time reprisals,” although that term is no longer used in deference to the 
neologism “countermeasures.” 18  The historical notion of reprisals was 
broader than that of countermeasures in that it included both non-forceful 
and forceful actions.19 Today, forceful reprisals have been subsumed into 
the UN Charter’s use of force paradigm, which allows States to resort to 
force in response to armed attacks.20 Care must likewise be taken to avoid 
confusing countermeasures with “belligerent reprisals.” As will be dis-
cussed, belligerent reprisals comprise actions taken during an armed con-
flict that would violate international humanitarian law but for the enemy’s 
prior unlawful conduct.21  
The fact that countermeasures involve acts that would otherwise be un-
lawful distinguishes them from retorsion. Retorsion refers to the taking of 
measures that are lawful, but “unfriendly.”22 A State may, for instance, 
block certain cyber transmission emanating from another State because the 
former enjoys sovereignty over cyber infrastructure on its territory.23 The 
                                                          
17. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at ¶¶ 82–83; Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 249; see also 
Responsabilité de l’Allemagne à Raison des Dommages Causés dans les Colonies Portugaises du Sud 
de l’Afrique (Port. v. Ger.) (Naulilaa Case), 2 R.I.A.A. 1011, 1025–26 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928); 
Responsabilité de l’Allemagne en Raison des Actes Commis Postérieurement au 31 Juillet 1914 et 
Avant que le Portugal ne Participât à la Guerre (Port. v. Ger.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1035, 1052 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
1930); Air Serv. Agreement of 27 Mar. 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.) (Air Serv.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417, 443–46 (Perm. 
Ct. Arb. 1978). 
18. See generally Matthias Ruffert, Reprisals, 8 MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 927 (2012). 
19. See, e.g., WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 433–34 (A. Pearce 
Higgins ed., 8th ed. 1924); T. J. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 311–15 (7th 
ed. 1923). 
20. Primarily, U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 39, 42, 51. For a discussion of this paradigm and its cus-
tomary nature, see the contributions on these articles in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: 
A COMMENTARY 200, 211–13 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2013). 
21. On belligerent reprisals, see FRITS KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS (1971).  
22. Thomas Giegerich, Retorsion, 8 MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 976 
(2012). 
23. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 1, rule 2. 
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action would be lawful even if detrimental to the interests of the latter so 
long as it violated no treaty obligation or applicable customary law norm. 
Similarly, voluntary or compulsory sanctions imposed by the Security 
Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter are not countermeas-
ures because the Council’s imprimatur renders them lawful. For example, 
Article 41 of the UN Charter describes interruption of communications as 
a non-forceful measure that may, with Security Council approval, be taken 
to address a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.24 
Thus, a Security Council resolution authorizing interference with a State’s 
cyber capabilities by damaging cyber infrastructure located in that State 
would render the activity lawful, and hence not a countermeasure, even if 
doing so would otherwise have infringed on the target State’s sovereign-
ty.25 In the same vein, although countermeasures often consist of acts that 
violate a treaty, simply terminating a treaty relationship pursuant to the 
treaty’s terms does not qualify as a countermeasure.26  
Countermeasures must also be distinguished from actions taken based 
on a plea of necessity. Faced with a situation threatening “grave and immi-
nent peril” to an “essential interest” (whether in the cyber realm or not), a 
State may take measures, including actions that would otherwise be inter-
nationally wrongful, to safeguard those interests.27 The measures may be 
either cyber or non-cyber, or a combination thereof.  
Actions based on the plea of necessity differ from countermeasures in 
three ways. First, there need be no underlying internationally wrongful act 
to justify them. Second, the originator of the precipitating act need not be 
a State, or indeed, even be identified, a particularly relevant consideration 
with respect to cyber operations. Third, action based on necessity is only 
available when the situation is dire; mere international wrongfulness does 
not suffice to trigger this response option, as it does with respect to coun-
termeasures.28 In the cyber context, the plea of necessity is most likely rel-
                                                          
24. U.N. Charter art. 41. 
25. In practical terms, such a measure is feasible only with respect to a country with a limited 
number of cables connecting its “domestic internet” with the external net. However, it would be 
nearly impossible to conduct against a large nation like the United States, especially in light of the 
added factor of satellite connectivity. 
26. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 42, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [herein-
after Vienna Convention]. 
27. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 25(1)(a). See also Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros 
Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶¶ 51, 55 (Sept. 25); Legal Consequences of the Construction 
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 140 (July 9). 
28. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RE-
SPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 178–86 (2002) [hereinafter COMMEN-
TARIES]. The Cambridge University Press publication reprints the official International Law Com-
mission’s Articles and accompanying commentary. See also TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 1, at 39–40. 
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evant when cyber operations threaten the operation of critical cyber infra-
structure. 
II. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO COUNTERMEASURES 
Countermeasures may only be taken in response to an internationally 
wrongful act. Such acts have two components: (1) breach of an interna-
tional obligation owed to another State, and (2) attributability of the 
wrongful act to the State in question.29 In the law of State responsibility, 
the State breaching the obligation is known as the “responsible State,” 
whereas the State to which the obligation is owed is styled the “injured 
State.” 
So long as these two conditions precedent are satisfied and there is full 
compliance with the requirements and limitations set forth below, coun-
termeasures, whether cyber or non-cyber in character, are allowable. For 
example, in 1998, the U.S. military launched an operation against a 
hacktivist group, the Electronic Disturbance Theater, which had targeted 
the Pentagon with a denial-of-service (DoS) attack.30 Qualification of the 
“hack back” as a lawful countermeasure would depend on identifying a 
violation of international law by the hacker group and determining if and 
how the group’s activities were connected to another State.  
A. Breach of an International Obligation 
An internationally wrongful act breaches the responsible State’s interna-
tional obligations to the injured State.31 The concept of breach in this con-
text does not extend to violations of domestic legal regimes.32 When a 
State has “injured” another State, group of States, or the international 
                                                          
29. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 2. 
30. Winn Schwartau, Striking Back, NETWORK WORLD FUSION (Jan. 11, 1999), http://www.netw 
orkworld.com/news/0111vigilante.html. 
31. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 2; COMMENTARIES, supra note 28, at 81. 
See also Phosphates in Morocco, (It. v. Fr.), Preliminary Objections, 1938 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 74, 
at ¶ 48 (June 14) (“This act being attributable to the State and described as contrary to the treaty right 
of another State, international responsibility would be established immediately as between the two 
States”); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran) (Tehran Hostages), 
Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 56 (May 24). Note that the requirement that the breach violate internation-
al law is stringent. As stated by the ICJ, “it is entirely possible for a particular act . . . not to be in 
violation of international law without necessarily constituting the exercise of a right conferred by it.” 
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 56 (July 22). An example of such a situation is espio-
nage, which, albeit not a violation, is equally not a right enjoyed by States. Of course, the conduct 
underlying an act of cyber espionage, such as an intrusive act causing damage to a cyber system, 
could violate international law. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 1, at 193–94.  
32. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 3. 
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community by such a breach, the injured State(s) may invoke the interna-
tional responsibility of the responsible State and demand cessation and (or) 
reparations.33  
The breach in question may consist of a violation of either a State’s 
treaty obligations or customary international law. For instance, a State that 
conducts cyber operations directed against a coastal nation from a ship 
located in the latter’s territorial sea is in breach of the innocent passage 
regime set forth in both the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea34 and 
customary international law.35 Similarly, a State’s aircraft nonconsensually 
engaging in cyber operations in the national airspace of another State is 
violating treaty and customary law.36 
Especially prominent among the relevant customary norms is the prin-
ciple of sovereignty, which, as noted in the Island of Palmas arbitration, 
“signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe 
is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the 
functions of a State.”37 In the cyber context, sovereignty grants a State the 
right (and in some cases the obligation) to regulate and control cyber activ-
ities and infrastructure on its territory.38  
Territorial sovereignty protects cyber infrastructure located on a State’s 
territory, regardless of its governmental character, or lack thereof. Conse-
quently, hostile cyber operations against cyber infrastructure on another 
State’s territory amount to, inter alia, a violation of that State’s sovereignty 
if they cause physical damage or injury.39  Of course, interference with 
                                                          
33. Id. arts. 30, 31, 34–37, 42, 48(1). Reparations may take the form of restitution, compensation, 
and satisfaction. Id. art. 34. Restitution involves the reestablishment of the situation that existed prior 
to the internationally wrongful act. Id. art. 35. Compensation involves financial payment for damage 
incurred by the internationally wrongful act to the extent that the damage is not made good by resti-
tution. Id. art. 36(1). Satisfaction consists of “an acknowledgment of the breach, an expression of 
regret, a formal apology or another appropriate modality.” Id. art. 37(2). 
34. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 17, 19, opened for signature Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994). 
35. The U.S. is not a party to the Law of the Sea Convention, but recognizes the right of inno-
cent passage, and the limitations thereon, as customary in nature. See U.S. NAVY/U.S. MARINE 
CORPS/U.S. COAST GUARD, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERA-
TIONS, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, ¶ 2.5.2.1 (July 2007) [hereinafter 
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK]. 
36. Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 1, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295; U.N. Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 34, art. 2(2); COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 35, 
¶ 1.9; PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY & CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD UNIV., MAN-
UAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE rule 1(a) and accom-
panying commentary (2013). 
37. Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). 
38. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 1, at 15–16. Cyber infrastructure refers to “[t]he communica-
tions, storage, and computing resources upon which information systems operate. The Internet is an 
example of a global information infrastructure.” Id. at 258. 
39. Id. at 16. This assumes there is no legal justification for the operations, such as self-defense or 
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cyber infrastructure aboard a sovereign platform is also a violation of the 
respective State’s sovereignty no matter where the platform is located.40  
Some international law experts take the position that sovereignty can at 
times be violated even when no damage results, as in the case of emplace-
ment of malware designed to monitor a system’s activities.41 This approach 
is highly defensible when considered in light of the principle of sovereign-
ty’s object and purpose. Sovereignty is meant to afford States the right to 
conduct, or allow, activities on their territory free from interference by 
other States. While monitoring activities in another State may merely con-
stitute espionage, which is not prohibited, emplacement of malware into a 
system, destruction of data, and hacking into a network to identify vulner-
abilities would seem to pierce the veil of sovereignty. Recent reports of 
Iranian hackers penetrating U.S. energy companies to acquire information 
on how to disrupt operations or destroy facilities illustrate the weakness of 
requiring damage as an essential element of a sovereignty violation.42 Simi-
larly, assuming attribution to Iran, the Shamoon virus attacks that erased 
thousands of Saudi Aramco’s hard drives without physically damaging 
them in 2012 should likewise be characterized as a violation of Saudi Ara-
bia’s sovereignty.43  
Cyber operations into another State violate the principle of noninter-
vention, and accordingly qualify as internationally wrongful acts, when in-
tended to coerce (as distinct from merely influence) the targeted State’s 
government in matters reserved to that State. Damage need not result.44 
As explained by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, “the principle forbids all 
States or groups of States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or 
external affairs of other States.”45 In that case, the Court held that supply-
                                                                                                                                      
the taking of countermeasures (see discussion infra). 
40. Id. rule 4. The cyber infrastructure concerned must serve exclusively governmental purposes. 
Id. at 24. 
41. Id. at 16. 
42. Siobhan Gorman & Danny Yadron, Iran Hacks Energy Firms, U.S. Says, WALL ST. J. (May 23, 
2013, 7:52 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873233361045785016011080 
21968. 
43. Christopher Bronk & Eneken Tikk-Rigas, The Cyber Attack on Saudi Aramco, SURVIVAL, Apr.–
May 2013, at 81.  
44. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 1, at 43–45. 
45. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) (Nicaragua), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 205 (June 27). See also Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9). The prohi-
bition derives from the principle of the sovereign equality of States as codified in Article 2(1) of the 
UN Charter. It is specifically acknowledged in the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Annex, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV), at 121 (Dec. 17, 1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations]. See 
also Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4(g), July 11, 2000, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.15 
(entered into force May 26, 2001); Charter of the Organization of American States art. 19, Apr. 30, 
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ing funds to guerilla forces in another country, although not a use of force 
in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,46 amounted to an unlawful 
intervention.47 By this finding, funding a non-State group’s cyber opera-
tions that rise to the level of a use of force would likewise constitute inter-
vention. Other examples that violate the principle of intervention include 
manipulation of public opinion polls on the eve of an election or bringing 
down the online services of a political party.48  
International law also imposes duties on States, the omission of which 
can qualify as a breach in the law of State responsibility. Conspicuous 
among these is the requirement that States maintain control over activities 
on their territory, an obligation the ICJ acknowledged in its first case, Corfu 
Channel. There, the Court held that a State may not “allow knowingly its 
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”49  
Based on this duty, the Tallinn Manual, a nonbinding study produced by 
an “International Group of Experts” in 2013, asserts, “[a] State shall not 
knowingly allow the cyber infrastructure located in its territory or under its 
exclusive governmental control to be used for acts that adversely and un-
lawfully affect other States.”50 States are required to use their “best efforts” 
to comply with the obligation.51 In that harmful cyber operations are often 
launched by non-State actors like “hacktivists,” and in light of the immi-
nent advent of “cyber terrorism,” a State’s obligation to control cyber ac-
tivities taking place on its territory looms especially large.52 
Various circumstances preclude the wrongfulness of a State’s acts or 
omissions, all of which apply fully in the cyber context. A State’s consent 
to a cyber operation by another State bars it from subsequently claiming 
                                                                                                                                      
1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. On intervention, see Philip Kunig, Prohibition of Intervention, 6 MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 289 (2012). 
46. “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner incon-
sistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” U.N. Charter art. 2(4). As to the norm’s customary 
international law nature, see Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶¶ 188–90. 
47. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 228.  
48. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 1, at 45. 
49. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 22. See also United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teh-
ran, 1980 I.C.J. 3, 67–68 (May 24) (Tehran Hostages); Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1963 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 1938). 
50. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 1, rule 5. The obligation applies when State organs or entities 
under governmental control can take the remedial action. The International Group of Experts asso-
ciated with the Tallinn Manual project also agreed “if a remedial action could only be performed by a 
private entity, such as a private Internet service provider, the State would be obliged to use all means 
at its disposal to require that entity to take the action necessary to terminate the activity.” Id. at 28. 
51. COMMENTARIES, supra note 28, at 140.  
52. The Tallinn Manual’s International Group of Experts could not agree on whether the obliga-
tion was borne by the State through whose territory the offending cyber operation passed. TALLINN 
MANUAL, supra note 1, at 28. 
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that the operation breached an obligation it was owed.53 For example, one 
State may allow another State to temporarily take control of certain facets 
of its cyber infrastructure in order to allow the latter to identify and re-
spond to malicious activities occurring therein. Should this occur, the for-
mer cannot claim injury, at least so long as the cyber activities in question 
were within the scope of the consent. Additionally, the wrongfulness of a 
cyber use of force is precluded if it qualifies as legitimate self- or collective 
defense,54 or has been authorized by the UN Security Council.55 Force 
majeure, distress, and necessity likewise preclude the wrongfulness of an 
act or omission, as does a need to comply with a peremptory norm of in-
ternational law.56 
Finally, qualification of an act as a countermeasure, the subject of this 
Article, excludes the wrongfulness of an act.57 As acknowledged in the Tal-
linn Manual, “[a] State injured by an internationally wrongful act may resort 
to proportionate countermeasures, including cyber countermeasures, 
against the responsible State.”58 In other words, a countermeasure is not 
an internationally wrongful act, and countermeasures may not be taken in 
response to legitimate countermeasures. 
B. Attribution to a State 
Countermeasures are only available when the precipitating breach is at-
tributable to a State pursuant to the law of State responsibility.59 There-
fore, to understand the permissible targets of countermeasures, it is neces-
sary to consider the scope of attribution under that body of law.  
Attribution is appropriate in a number of circumstances.60 The clearest 
case is when State organs, such as the military or intelligence agencies, au-
thor the wrongful acts.61 For instance, all cyber activities of U.S. Cyber 
                                                          
53. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 20. 
54. Id. art. 21; U.N. Charter art. 51.  
55. U.N. Charter art. 42. 
56. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, arts. 23–26. To illustrate, assume one State is 
legally obligated to maintain particular cyber communications with another State. An example of 
force majeure would be interruption of the cyber communications due to a natural disaster. Distress 
would be exemplified by interrupting them due to the risk of malware infection from a third State. 
Shutting off cyber communications in order to ensure the infrastructure is not used to incite genocide 
would represent the third factor precluding wrongfulness.  
57. Id. art. 22. In international law, acts are generally lawful unless expressly prohibited. S.S. Lotus 
(Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 3, 18 (Sept. 7). Thus, a countermeasure does 
not render an action permissible; rather, qualification as such keeps it from being unlawful. 
58. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 1, rule 9, which is based on Articles 22 and 49–53 of the Arti-
cles on State Responsibility, supra note 13. 
59. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 2(a). 
60. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 1, rule 6. 
61. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 4(1).  
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Command or the National Security Agency are fully attributable to the 
United States and engage its responsibility under international law.  
Confirming that a governmental organ originated a cyber operation can 
prove challenging even when launched from government cyber infrastruc-
ture. In particular, such infrastructure is susceptible to exploitation by non-
State actors. Moreover, the groups or individuals involved may intentional-
ly try to create the impression that a particular State was behind the opera-
tion (“spoofing”). The need to respond promptly to some cyber opera-
tions can complicate the attribution dilemma.  
Cognizant of this reality, the Tallinn Manual concludes that although 
“[t]he mere fact that a cyber operation has been launched or otherwise 
originates from governmental cyber infrastructure is not sufficient evi-
dence for attributing the operation to that State[,] [it] is an indication that 
the State in question is associated with the operation.”62 Reliable intelli-
gence that a non-State group will attempt to spoof the origin of hostile 
cyber operations would, for example, augur against any such conclusion. 
So too would the existence of friendly relations between the injured State 
and the purported responsible State. When feasible, a State that is believed 
to be responsible for a cyber operation because the precipitating cyber op-
eration originated from its cyber infrastructure should be afforded an op-
portunity to rebut the assumption. Understandably, each situation must be 
considered in context.  
The fact that a harmful cyber operation has been mounted using private 
cyber infrastructure, or has simply been routed through governmental or 
nongovernmental cyber infrastructure in a State’s territory, does not suf-
fice to indicate association.63 This is a particularly important limitation giv-
en the possibility of creating botnets using zombie computers in multiple 
countries to mount distributed DoS attacks. As an illustration, in 2013 a 
North Korean cyber operation employing more than 1000 IP addresses in 
forty countries shut down thousands of South Korean media and banking 
computers and servers.64 Obviously most, if not all, of the countries in-
volved were completely unassociated with the operation. 
                                                          
62. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 1, rule 7.  
63. See the exclusion of other than governmental cyber infrastructure in the TALLINN MANUAL, 
supra note 1, rule 7, and id. rule 8 and accompanying commentary. In Corfu Channel, the ICJ stated that 
“it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by a State over its territory and 
waters that that State necessarily knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated 
therein, nor yet that it necessarily knew, or should have known the authors.” (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 
I.C.J. 4, 18 (Apr. 9). 
64. Youkyung Lee, South Korea Says North Korea Behind Computer Crash In March, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Apr. 10, 2013, 2:51 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/10/north-korea-cyberatt 
ack_n_3050992.html. 
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As discussed, the failure of a State to take feasible measures to terminate 
harmful cyber operations originating in its territory also constitutes an in-
ternationally wrongful omission by that State. Injured States taking coun-
termeasures based on such a breach must be cautious. In particular, the 
proportionality of the countermeasure (a requirement that is examined be-
low) will be determined with respect to the responsible State’s failure to 
properly police its territory. It will not be judged solely against the severity 
and consequences of the offending cyber operations that the responsible 
State had a duty to terminate. In other words, the harmful cyber operation 
is not “imputed” to the State from which it was launched. Rather, the 
countermeasure must be designed to compel the responsible State to po-
lice the cyber infrastructure and activities on its territory. 
Acts committed by persons or entities that do not qualify as State or-
gans, but which are empowered by domestic law to exercise elements of 
governmental authority, are equally attributable to the State, albeit only 
with respect to the exercise of said authority.65 The persons or entities are 
essentially equated to State organs for the purposes of the law of State re-
sponsibility. Examples include a private sector computer emergency re-
sponse team (CERT) authorized to protect State activities and a private 
company that has been contracted to conduct offensive cyber operations 
for the military or to gather intelligence by cyber means on behalf of the 
State’s intelligence agencies. The key is that the acts in question must be of 
a governmental character and performed based on legal authorization, 
such as legislation or contract, from the State. 
In the case of activities by either State organs or entities empowered to 
exercise elements of governmental authority, the State bears responsibility 
even when the conduct in question is ultra vires, that is, exceeds the authori-
ty granted by the State or contravenes the State’s instructions.66 To take a 
simple example, if a member of a government CERT conducts unlawful 
activities in defiance of orders to the contrary, the member’s State incurs 
responsibility for any breach of obligations owed to other States. 
The actions of one State can occasionally result in the responsibility of 
another, thereby opening the door to countermeasures directed against 
both (assuming the act or omission violates an obligation owed by both to 
the injured State). This possibility arises in three circumstances. First, a 
                                                          
65. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 5. Note that pursuant to Article 6, if the 
organ of a State is placed at the disposal of another State to exercise elements of governmental au-
thority, the conduct of that organ is attributable to the latter. In such a case, only the State which the 
organ was placed at the disposal of bears responsibility for the actions. COMMENTARIES, supra note 
28, at 145. 
66. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 7. It is unsettled whether the State where 
the cyber infrastructure is located has an obligation to take measures to prevent prospective harmful 
cyber operations. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 1, at 27. 
710 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 54:3 
State aiding the commission of an internationally wrongful act by another 
will bear responsibility if it does so knowing the circumstances surround-
ing the unlawful act and if the act would have been wrongful if committed 
by the State providing the assistance.67 A case in point would be allowing 
another State to use the assisting State’s cyber infrastructure to mount the 
offending operation. Likewise, a State will be responsible for a cyber oper-
ation conducted by another State if it finances the operation. The require-
ment that the State know of the circumstances of the internationally 
wrongful act is critical in this regard. For instance, if a State finances the 
acquisition of cyber capabilities by another without knowing that those 
capabilities will be used to conduct harmful acts, it would bear no respon-
sibility for them.  
Care must be taken in the application of this rule. When a State’s assis-
tance is an essential aspect of an operation, as in allowing its cyber infra-
structure to be used in order to conduct the operation, the State will be 
responsible for the injury suffered and subject to countermeasures on that 
basis. Yet, if the assistance is not an integral component of the wrongful 
act, the assisting State will be responsible for the support alone and subject 
only to countermeasures that are proportionate to such assistance. This 
might be the case if the aiding State merely provides some of the opera-
tion’s financing.68 
The second basis for a State’s responsibility for another State’s wrongful 
cyber operation exists when the former directs and controls the latter’s 
commission of the operation.69 The State mounting the operation essen-
tially serves as a surrogate; therefore, the State exercising direction and 
control is fully responsible for its surrogate’s actions and subject to coun-
termeasures that would be an appropriate response to the cyber operation 
itself. These situations are rare, for States, while perhaps subject to other 
States’ influences, are seldom in their control. Occupation is the most rele-
vant contemporary illustration.  
Coercion is the third basis for rendering a State responsible for another 
State’s wrongful acts.70 The level of coercive effect must be very high; 
“[n]othing less than conduct which forces the will of the coerced State will 
suffice, giving it no effective choice but to comply with the wishes of the 
coercing State.”71 As an example, a State might threaten serious cyber at-
                                                          
67. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 16. With respect to the wrongfulness re-
quirement vis-à-vis the assisting State, note that a State is not bound by the obligations of another 
State with regard to third States. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 26, arts. 34–35. 
68. COMMENTARIES, supra note 28, at 151. 
69. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 17. 
70. Id. art. 18. 
71. COMMENTARIES, supra note 28, at 156. 
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tacks against a coerced State if the latter does not engage in a particular 
cyber operation, such as altering critical data of a third State stored on 
servers located in the coerced State. 
Attribution of the acts of individuals or entities that are neither State 
organs, nor empowered to exercise governmental functions, is of particular 
importance in the cyber context. Generally, the acts of private actors are 
not attributable to States. However, Article 8 of the Articles on State Re-
sponsibility provides “[t]he conduct of a person or group of persons shall 
be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or 
group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the di-
rection or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.”72 Note that 
there is no requirement that the activities be inherently governmental in 
character. 
The “on the instructions” situation would present itself where a group 
of private individuals that has been recruited or instigated by a State oper-
ates as its auxiliary without being specifically commissioned to do so pur-
suant to the domestic legal regime, as with a group of volunteers who con-
duct cyber operations on behalf of a State. The group, although not form-
ing a part of any organization in the State structure, might, for example, 
perform particular functions within the State’s cyber operations system, 
like identifying vulnerabilities in cyber infrastructure that are later exploited 
by the State’s cyber units. The group is effectively part of the State’s cyber 
forces. In such a case, States injured by the group’s activities could resort 
to countermeasures against the “sponsoring” State. 
Article 8 scenarios can also involve groups or individuals that act “un-
der the direction or control” of the State for particular activities.73 As an 
example, one State may direct the actions of a group of hacktivists sharing 
its ethnicity or religion that is based in another State. If that group engages 
in harmful cyber operations against the latter at the behest of the former, 
the former will be responsible for those activities. Since the relationship 
with the State is more attenuated than in the previous “auxiliary” case, 
their conduct “will be attributable to the State only if it directed or con-
trolled the specific operation and the conduct complained of was an inte-
                                                          
72. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 8. This issue was addressed in the most au-
thoritative U.S. statement on the law of cyber operations to date, a speech by the (then) State De-
partment Legal Adviser. Harold H. Koh, International Law in Cyberspace, Remarks at the 
USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference, Fort Meade, Maryland (Sept. 18, 2012), in 54 
HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 1, 6–7 (2012) [hereinafter Koh Statement], available at http://www.harvard 
ilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Koh-Speech-to-Publish1.pdf; see also Michael N. Schmitt, The 
Koh Speech and the Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 13 (2012), available at http:// 
www.harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/HILJ-Online_54_Schmitt.pdf (comparing the 
Koh address and the Tallinn Manual ). 
73. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 8. 
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gral part of that operation.”74 Recent reports of “cyber mercenaries” illus-
trate these situations.75  
Incidental or peripheral association with a State’s cyber operations does 
not warrant attribution. The hacktivist operations against Estonia and 
Georgia in 2007 and 2008 respectively were not, at least on the available 
evidence, sufficiently under Russia’s control to justify attribution, and 
therefore countermeasures, by those countries against Russia.76 Similarly, 
in April 2013, the Syrian Electronic Army tweeted from the Associated 
Press’ Twitter account that President Obama had been wounded during an 
attack on the White House. Within a few minutes the Dow Jones Industri-
al Average dropped 143 points, resulting in a $136 billion loss.77 Yet, in the 
absence of direction and control by Syria, countermeasures were unavaila-
ble as a response option (even assuming a breach of an obligation).  
In light of the growing ability of individuals and private groups to 
mount harmful cyber operations against States, these situations are likely 
to become increasingly common. The complexity of establishing the con-
nection to the State is also an obstacle, a reality well demonstrated by 
Mandiant’s analysis of the actions of the cyber espionage group APT 1.78 
Of course, as discussed, States have a duty to control cyber operations be-
ing conducted from their territory and the failure to do so may provide a 
separate ground for countermeasures. 
The possibility of attributing acts based on a State’s direction and con-
trol of non-State actors begs the question of the requisite degree of direc-
tion and control. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ posed the question of 
whether the United States was responsible for the acts of the Contra in-
surgents against the government of Nicaragua. The Court held that “[f]or 
this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it 
would in principle have to be proved that that State had effective control 
of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged 
violations were committed.”79  
                                                          
74. COMMENTARIES, supra note 28, at 110. 
75 . Zachary Fryer-Biggs, New Cyber ‘Mercenaries’ Prefer Quick Strikes, Researchers Say, DEFENSE 
NEWS (Sept. 27, 2013, 11:15 AM), http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130927/DEFREG02/30 
9270009/New-Cyber-Mercenaries-Prefer-Quick-Strikes-Researchers-Say?odyssey=nav%7Chead; Jeb 
Boone, Mercenary Hacker Group ‘Hidden Lynx’ Emerges as World's Most Potent Cyber Threat, GLOBALPOST 
(Sept. 18, 2013, 11:32 AM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/the-grid/hack 
er-mercenary-group-china-hidden-lynx-worlds-most-potent-cyber-threat. 
76. See generally ENEKEN TIKK, KADRI KASKA & LIIS VIHUL, INTERNATIONAL CYBER INCI-
DENTS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS (2010). 
77. Steven Stalinsky, China Isn't the Only Source of Cyberattacks, WALL ST. J. (May 21, 2013, 7:19 
PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324744104578475571183053736.  
78. See generally APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, MANDIANT (2013), available at 
http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf. 
79. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) (Nicaragua), 1986 
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This standard should not be confused, as it often is, with the “overall 
control” test set forth by the International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia’s Appeals Chamber in the Tadić case.80 There, the Tribunal 
dealt with the issue of the relationship between States and non-State ac-
tors, but only with respect to whether the armed conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina was international in character based on the link between the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serb forces. In its Genocide 
judgment, the ICJ correctly distinguished the two standards, affirming that 
for the purpose of attribution in the law of State responsibility, the effec-
tive control test was the proper one.81 Therefore, a State has to be in effec-
tive control and direction of a group conducting cyber operations before 
countermeasures may be used; it must be acting on the State’s behalf. 
Providing financial or other support for the operations falls short. Indeed, 
as the Court noted in Nicaragua, “even the general control . . . over a force 
with a high degree of dependency on it” does not constitute effective con-
trol.82 
An interesting situation involves State-owned companies, such as an in-
formation technology firm. State ownership of a company alone is insuffi-
cient to attribute its actions to the State such that countermeasures are 
available against the State for the wrongful conduct of the firm.83 Howev-
er, as discussed, if the company engages in cyber operations that comprise 
a governmental function, or if the operations in question are conducted 
under the State’s effective control and direction, its activities are attributa-
ble to the State and countermeasures against the State are appropriate in 
relation to those actions. 
It must be cautioned that geography is irrelevant to the issue of attribu-
tion. Non-State actors may, and likely often will, launch a cyber operation 
from outside territory controlled by the State to which the conduct is at-
tributable. A paradigmatic example would involve non-State actors in one 
State under the direction and control of another State assimilating com-
puters located in multiple States into a botnet, and using the botnet to tar-
get the injured State. The determinative issue is the level of direction and 
control, not the location of the activities. 
Finally, and unlike situations involving State organs or those exercising 
governmental functions, attribution based on direction and control does 
                                                                                                                                      
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 115 (June 27). 
80. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, ¶¶ 117, 131–40, 145 
(Intl’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
81. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶¶ 403–05 (Feb. 26). 
82. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 115. 
83. COMMENTARIES, supra note 28, at 112. 
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not extend to acts exceeding the direction (i.e., ultra vires acts). In other 
words, acts that clearly exceed the State’s instructions do not result in at-
tribution.84 For instance, if a State instructs a hacktivist group in another 
country not to target critical cyber infrastructure, and the group neverthe-
less does so, the group’s actions will provide no basis for taking counter-
measures against the State. 
III. COUNTERMEASURES REQUIREMENTS AND RESTRICTIONS  
A. Purpose of Countermeasures 
The sole permissible purpose of countermeasures is to return a situation 
to lawfulness.85 Therefore, as noted in the Articles on State Responsibility, 
a State that is responsible for an internationally wrongful act against an-
other State is obliged to cease an ongoing act (or rectify an omission) and 
to “offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if cir-
cumstances so require.”86 Moreover, if the internationally wrongful act has 
caused injury, the responsible State must provide reparations for that inju-
ry. The term “injury” refers to any material or moral damage caused by the 
internationally wrongful act. 87  Countermeasures are not permissible for 
other purposes, such as retaliation or punishment.  
 Reflecting the purpose of inducing a return to lawful relations between 
the States concerned, the ICJ has opined that countermeasures must gen-
erally be reversible; they should, as far as possible, be taken in such a way 
as to permit the resumption or performance of the obligations involved in 
the countermeasure.88 This requirement is not absolute. For instance, a 
DoS countermeasure can be terminated and service restored, but the activ-
ities that were blocked may not be able to be performed later. This would 
not bar the countermeasure. This said, countermeasures are generally 
viewed as temporary measures and therefore “must be as far as possible 
reversible in their effects in terms of future legal relations between the two 
States.”89 
                                                          
84. Id. at 113. 
85. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 49(1). In Archer Daniels Midland Company v. 
Mexico, Mexico’s argument that a tax was lawful as a countermeasure was rejected on the basis that 
Mexico did not impose it in order to compel the United States to comply with its obligations. Archer 
Daniels Midland Co. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/05, Award, ¶¶ 134–51 
(Nov. 21, 2007). 
86. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 30. 
87. Id. art. 31. 
88. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 87 (Sept. 25); Articles on State 
Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 49(3). 
89. COMMENTARIES, supra note 28, at 283. 
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Since their sole purpose is to incentivize the resumption of lawful inter-
actions, the risk of escalation should be taken into account when deciding 
whether, and how, to engage in countermeasures. Relatedly, a counter-
measure that will only exacerbate the situation is regarded as a mere retalia-
tion (although it would seem that States sometimes de facto act in retalia-
tion). Thus, as noted in the Air Services arbitration, “[c]ounter-measures . . . 
should be a wager on the wisdom, not on the weakness of the other Party. 
They should be used with a spirit of great moderation and be accompanied 
by a genuine effort at resolving the dispute.”90 This cautionary note is es-
pecially relevant with regard to cyber countermeasures, as the speed with 
which the precipitating hostile cyber operations may unfold poses a partic-
ular risk of rapid retaliatory exchange that leaves little time for the careful 
consideration of possible consequences. 
Lastly, by virtue of their intent to induce a return to lawful relations, 
countermeasures are reactive, not prospective. As the ICJ observed in the 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymoros Project case, they “must be taken in response to a pre-
vious international wrongful act of another State.”91 There is no counter-
measure equivalent to anticipatory self-defense against a prospective cyber 
armed attack.92 Nor may countermeasures be employed for deterrent pur-
poses.  
B. Situations Precluding Countermeasures 
Since they are designed to impel a return to lawful relations between the 
States involved, countermeasures may not be taken in response to an in-
ternationally wrongful act that is complete and unlikely to be repeated.93 
Article 53 of the Articles on State Responsibility provides, “Countermeas-
ures shall be terminated as soon as the responsible State has complied with 
its obligations [of cessation and reparation] in relation to the international-
ly wrongful act.”94 Note that if reparations are due, the countermeasures 
may continue even though the wrongful act has ended. Additionally, coun-
termeasures remain available when the internationally wrongful act is but 
one in a series of wrongful acts. As an example, if an injured State had 
been subjected to a series of DoS attacks such that it would be reasonable 
                                                          
90. Air Serv. Agreement of 27 Mar. 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.) (Air Serv.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417, ¶ 91 (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 1978). 
91. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at ¶ 83. 
92 . See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 1, at 63–66; see generally Terry D. Gill & Paul A. L. 
Ducheine, Anticipatory Self-Defense in the Cyber Context, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 438 (2013). 
93. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, arts. 49(2) ASR, 52(3)(a); see also Maurice 
Kamto, The Time Factor in the Application of Countermeasures, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY 1169 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010). 
94. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 53.  
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to conclude that further attacks will take place, the injured State may take 
countermeasures to induce the responsible State to desist from its pattern 
of conduct.  
In light of their purpose, countermeasures must be suspended when the 
internationally wrongful act has ceased and the dispute in question is pend-
ing before a “court or tribunal” that may issue a binding decision in the 
matter.95 In that a judicial body is handling the situation, the element of 
necessity is missing. The phrase “court or tribunal,” drawn from the Arti-
cles on State Responsibility, refers to “any third party dispute settlement 
procedure, whatever its designation.”96  
This prohibition applies only once the case is sub judice.97 While it might 
appear that such a limitation runs counter to the goal of resuming lawful 
relations, it can be argued that countermeasures provide an incentive to 
agree to binding arbitration or referral to a judicial body.98 Additionally, 
the exclusion of cases that are sub judice is tempered by the condition that 
the court or tribunal in question must enjoy the authority to order “interim 
measures of protection, regardless of whether this power is expressly men-
tioned or implied in its statute (at least as the power to formulate recom-
mendations to this effect).”99 Should the judicial body lack such power, or 
if the exercise thereof is significantly restricted, the injured State may retain 
the right to initiate or maintain countermeasures.100 
A further obstacle to countermeasures is that, as recognized by the 
Naulilaa arbitration with respect to reprisals, a request for the responsible 
State to remedy the internationally wrongful act must precede the meas-
ure.101 The ICJ has confirmed that this requirement applies to counter-
measures. In Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, the Court held that before a counter-
measure may be taken, “the injured State must have called upon the State 
committing the wrongful act to discontinue its wrongful conduct or to 
                                                          
95. Id. art. 52(3). 
96. COMMENTARIES, supra note 28, at 299. The term does not include cases that have been re-
ferred to political entities such as the United Nations Security Council. Id. 
97. Air Serv. Agreement of 27 Mar. 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.) (Air Serv.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417, ¶ 95 (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 1978). Additionally, the court or tribunal must exist and enjoy jurisdiction over the matter. 
COMMENTARIES, supra note 28, at 299. For instance, the limitation does not apply to an ad hoc tribu-
nal established by treaty, which has not yet been formed. Id. 
98. See, e.g., Air Serv., 18 R.I.A.A. at ¶ 95. 
99. Id. ¶ 96. 
100. Id. 
101 . Responsabilité de l’Allemagne à Raison des Dommages Causés dans les Colonies 
Portugaises du Sud de l’Afrique (Port. v. Ger.) (Naulilaa Case), 2 R.I.A.A. 1011, 1026 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
1928). See generally Yuji Iwasawa & Naoki Iwatsuki, Procedural Conditions, in THE LAW OF INTERNA-
TIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1149 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010). Note that the arbitration dealt with 
forcible reprisals, which would not qualify as countermeasures. That said, the decision is viewed as 
the key early case in the development of this body of law.  
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make reparation for it.”102 The Articles on State Responsibility, which re-
quire an injured State to specify the conduct that it deems unlawful and the 
form reparations should take, likewise reflect the requirement.103 An in-
jured State must afford the responsible State an opportunity to respond to 
its request. Moreover, the former must notify the latter of any decision to 
take countermeasures and offer to negotiate on the matter, although in 
some cases it is reasonable to provide both notifications simultaneously.104 
These requirements are sensible in light of the fact that a countermeas-
ure, by definition, involves a breach of what would otherwise be the in-
jured State’s international law obligation towards the responsible State. 
They accordingly comport with international law’s preference for solutions 
to disputes that minimize the potential for escalatory illegality. In the case 
of cyber operations, the conditions are especially germane because the 
originator of an attack may be spoofed, or, in the case of a failure to ter-
minate activities from a State’s territory, the territorial State may be una-
ware of the activities. 
However, the requirements are not categorical. In certain circumstances, 
it may be necessary for an injured State to act immediately in order to pre-
serve its rights and avoid further injury. When such circumstances arise, 
the injured State may launch countermeasures without notification of its 
intent to do so.105 As an example, assume that very serious wrongful cyber 
operations are underway against the injured State’s banking system. The 
injured State can respond with cyber countermeasures designed to block 
electronic access to the responsible State’s bank accounts. However, noti-
fying the responsible State of its intent to do so would afford that State an 
opportunity to transfer assets out of the country or to address the vulnera-
bilities to be exploited, thereby effectively depriving the injured State of 
the possibility of taking such countermeasures. 
Moreover, as the Air Services arbitration reasonably observed, “it is [not] 
possible, in the present state of international relations, to lay down a rule 
prohibiting the use of counter-measures during negotiations . . . .”106 There 
is no duty to abstain from countermeasures during negotiations that are 
not being conducted in good faith107 or when the internationally wrongful 
acts are still underway and causing significant injury. Additionally, ongoing 
negotiations cannot bar countermeasures indefinitely. “What constitutes a 
                                                          
102. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 84 (Sept. 25). See also Air 
Serv., 18 R.I.A.A. at ¶¶ 85–87. 
103. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, arts. 43(2), 52(1)(a).  
104. Id. art. 52(1)(b); COMMENTARIES, supra note 28, at 298. 
105. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 52(2). 
106. Air Serv., 18 R.I.A.A. at ¶ 91. 
107. See Lac Lanoux (Fr. v. Spain), 12 R.I.A.A. 281, 306–07 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1957). 
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reasonable duration of a negotiation will in fact depend on the circum-
stances, including the attitude of the responsible State, the urgency of the 
questions at stake, the likelihood that damage may be exacerbated if a 
speedy resolution is not achieved, etc.”108 
An unresolved issue is whether “amicable” means of settling a dispute 
(as distinct from mere negotiations) involving adverse cyber operations 
must be exhausted before countermeasures are pursued. It is sometimes 
suggested that such an obligation derives from Articles 2(3) and 33 of the 
UN Charter, which set forth the principle of peaceful settlement of dis-
pute.109 The counterargument is that countermeasures, by not involving 
the use of force, already qualify as peaceful means of settling a dispute. By 
this line of reasoning, amicable settlement, that is, settlement by means 
that would otherwise be lawful, is not required.110 The most judicious ap-
proach would be one that assesses whether “amicable” measures would be 
reasonably likely to resolve the matter satisfactorily, and correspondingly, 
whether countermeasures would aggravate it.111 If the latter, amicable set-
tlement would presumptively be required. 
C. Restrictions on Countermeasures 
The law of State responsibility imposes a number of restrictions on the 
execution of countermeasures. In particular, certain obligations of the in-
jured State may not be breached when conducting countermeasures. These 
prohibitions apply both to non-cyber responses to internationally wrongful 
acts carried out by cyber means and to cyber countermeasures taken in 
response to wrongful acts, whether cyber in nature or not. 
Prominent among them is the obligation to refrain from the use of 
force that is set forth in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and which reflects 
customary international law.112 This prohibition was specifically cited with 
respect to reprisals in the General Assembly’s Declaration on Friendly Re-
                                                          
108. Kamto, supra note 93, at 1171, citing commentary to draft article 48, Report of the International 
Law Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its 48th Session, [1996] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N, 
57, 68–69, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (Pt. 2). 
109. See, e.g., Luigi Condorelli, Le règlement des Différends en Matière de Responsabilité Internationale des 
Etats: Quelques Remarques Candides sur le Débat à la C.D.I., 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 106 (1994). 
110. See, e.g., Bruno Simma, Counter-measures and Dispute Settlement: A Plea for a Different Balance, 5 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 102 (1994). 
111. See discussion in Iwasawa & Iwatsuki, supra note 101, at 1152–53. 
112. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 50(1)(a); see also Arbitral Tribunal Consti-
tuted Pursuant to Article 287, and in Accordance with Annex VII, of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (Guy. v. Surin.), Award, ¶ 446 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007), available at 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=664. 
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lations.113 It is also consistent with the ICJ’s jurisprudence114 and is repli-
cated in Article 50(1) of the Articles on State Responsibility. 
The dilemma lies in determining when a cyber operation qualifies as a 
use of force such that it cannot be executed as a countermeasure. No au-
thoritative definition of the term “use of force” exists in international law 
and, as a result, the Tallinn Manual’s International Group of Experts strug-
gled with this issue throughout its three years of deliberations. All that 
could be agreed on was that “[a] cyber operation constitutes a use of force 
when its scale and effects are comparable to non-cyber operations rising to 
the level of a use of force.”115  
Clearly, a cyber operation that results in damage or destruction of tangi-
ble objects or injury or death of individuals beyond a de minimis level quali-
fies. It is also apparent that a cyber operation need not necessarily be phys-
ically damaging or injurious to qualify as a use of force. In Nicaragua, for 
example, the ICJ held that the arming and training of guerillas amounted 
to a use of force.116 This conclusion was not based on the attribution of 
the guerilla’s use of force to the supporting State, but rather on the sup-
porting State’s conduct in arming and training them. However, the extent 
to which activities with consequences falling short of physical damage or 
injury qualify as a use of force remains an unsettled question.  
Unable to identify a bright-line test for cyber uses of force, the Tallinn 
Manual Experts chose to underline certain non-exclusive and extra-legal 
factors that States are likely to consider when determining whether to 
characterize a cyber operation as a use of force: immediacy, directness, 
invasiveness, measurability of effects, military character, State involvement, 
and presumptive legitimacy.117 Other factors highlighted as relevant in-
clude the prevailing political environment, the identity of the attacker and 
its record of engaging in hostile actions, and the nature of the target.118 
The approach necessitates a case-by-case analysis in which the weight ac-
corded these and other factors varies depending on the circumstances. 
Consequently, uncertainty will sometimes exist as to whether a cyber oper-
ation taken in response to an internationally wrongful act reached the use 
of force threshold and thereby failed to qualify as a countermeasure.  
A minority approach asserts that forceful countermeasures reaching the 
level of use of force are appropriate in response to an internationally 
                                                          
113. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 45, ¶ 6. See also Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, princ. II, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292. 
114. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9); Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) (Nicaragua), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 249 (June 27). 
115. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 1, rule 11. 
116. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 228. 
117. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 1, at 48–51. 
118. Id. at 51–52. 
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wrongful act that constitutes a use of force, but remains below the armed 
attack threshold. The approach responds to a paradoxical consequence of 
limiting countermeasures to non-forceful actions. In Nicaragua, the ICJ 
asserted that the level of force necessary to breach the prohibition on the 
use of force was lower than that of an armed attack, the condition prece-
dent to using force in self-defense.119 Although some States, most notably 
the United States, have rejected the Court’s position,120 if such a “gap” 
between uses of force and armed attacks thresholds exists, States subjected 
to uses of cyber force not reaching the armed attack level may only re-
spond with non-forceful actions.  
To remedy this situation, Judge Simma, in his separate opinion in the 
Oil Platforms case, has suggested: 
But we may encounter also a lower level of hostile military action, 
not reaching the threshold of an “armed attack” within the meaning 
of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Against such hostile 
acts, a State may of course defend itself, but only within the more 
limited range and quality of responses (the main difference being 
that the possibility of collective self-defence does not arise, cf. Nic-
aragua) and bound to necessity, proportionality and immediacy in 
time in a particularly strict way.121 
The reference to the inadmissibility of collective action, which, in part, 
distinguishes countermeasures from self-defense, confirms that Judge 
Simma supports a limited right to take forceful countermeasures in the 
face of a use of force falling within the gap. What this approach might 
mean in the cyber context will remain an open question until uncertainty 
as to the use of force and armed attack thresholds is resolved. 
For States that reject the notion of a gap, this dilemma does not present 
itself. A State subjected to a wrongful use of force has, by the no-gap in-
terpretation, equally been the object of an armed attack. It may respond 
with its own use of force, whether cyber or non-cyber in nature, pursuant 
to the law of self-defense. 
Beyond the prohibition on countermeasures involving the use of force, 
Article 50(1) of the Articles on State Responsibility provides that counter-
measures may not affect obligations intended for the protection of funda-
mental human rights.122 Although the Article does not define the term 
                                                          
119. The Court distinguished “the most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an 
armed attack) from other less grave forms.” Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 191. See also Oil Platforms 
(Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 51 (Nov. 6); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. 
Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 147 (Dec. 19).  
120. Koh Statement, supra note 72, at 7. 
121. Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. at 333 (paragraph 13 of separate opinion of Judge Simma). 
122. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 50(1)(b). 
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“fundamental,” at a minimum it encompasses human rights that may not 
be derogated from during periods of national emergency or armed con-
flict.123 The open question is the degree to which the prohibition extends 
to other human rights. For instance, cyber activities raise concerns regard-
ing communication and data protection rights,124 thereby begging the ques-
tion of whether a cyber operation that violates such rights can qualify as a 
countermeasure. 
In its explication of Article 50(1), the Commentary to the Articles on State 
Responsibility refers to General Comment 8, issued by the UN Committee 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.125 Comment 8, which addresses 
economic sanctions and their effects on civilians, emphasizes that “it is 
essential to distinguish between the basic objective of applying political 
and economic pressure upon the governing élite of the country to per-
suade them to conform to international law, and the collateral infliction of 
suffering upon the most vulnerable groups within the targeted country.”126 
The Commentary also points to other provisions of international law de-
signed to protect the civilian population, such as international humanitari-
an law’s prohibition on starvation and the UN human rights covenants on 
depriving a people of their means of subsistence.127 As these references 
illustrate, there appears to be a general predisposition against counter-
measures that might affect the civilian population, as distinct from those 
designed to coerce the government into compliance with its international 
legal obligations. There is no rationale for distinguishing cyber from non-
cyber countermeasures in this regard.  
Article 50(1) also bans the use of belligerent reprisals as countermeas-
ures.128 The Commentary to the provision cites the ban on reprisals set forth 
in the 1929 Geneva Convention, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, and 
the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.129 There is 
                                                          
123. For instance, see the list of non-derogable rights set forth in International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights art. 4(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
124. See, e.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union arts. 7, 8, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 
O.J. (C 364) 1; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.  
125. COMMENTARIES, supra note 28, at 289 (citing Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, General Comment 8, The Relationship Between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1997/8 (Dec. 12, 1997) [hereinafter General 
Comment 8]). 
126. General Comment 8, supra note 125, ¶ 4. 
127. COMMENTARIES, supra note 28, at 289–90 (citing Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Con-
flicts art. 54(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]); International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
128. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 50(1)(c). 
129. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
 
722 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 54:3 
substantial agreement that the five referenced Geneva Conventions’ pro-
hibitions reflect customary international humanitarian law, and that there-
fore reprisals (and by extension countermeasures) that target the wounded, 
sick, shipwrecked, medical personnel, religious personnel, and prisoners of 
war during times of armed conflict are impermissible. For example, it 
would be forbidden to conduct cyber attacks against the enemy’s wounded 
personnel by cutting electricity to a medical facility in a manner that affect-
ed treatment in response to a kinetic or cyber attack on one’s own wound-
ed soldiers.  
It should be cautioned that some States, including the United States, 
take the position that Additional Protocol I’s prohibition on reprisals 
against civilians is not customary in nature and therefore applies only to 
States Parties to that instrument.130 There being no bar to such reprisals 
for these States, a cyber reprisal against the civilian population would fail 
to qualify as a countermeasure because it would be lawful. The net result 
of these positions is that no belligerent reprisal is ever a countermeasure, 
either because it is subject to a specific exclusion in the law of State re-
sponsibility, or because it is lawful and accordingly does not meet the defi-
nition of a countermeasure. 
States are proscribed from breaching certain other obligations on the 
basis that they are engaging in countermeasures. Those involving a viola-
tion of a peremptory norm, such as genocide, are not permitted.131 Thus, 
using cyber or non-cyber means to incite genocide, for instance by manip-
ulating the content of news reports, cannot qualify as a countermeasure. 
Additionally, as a general matter, cyber or non-cyber countermeasures may 
not be taken when the obligation that would be violated (whether by an act 
in cyberspace or not) by the countermeasures is subject to a dispute set-
tlement procedure related to the dispute in question.132 This is so even 
when the dispute resolution mechanism is contained in the treaty that the 
                                                                                                                                      
Armies in the Field art. 2, July 27, 1929, 118 L.N.T.S. 303; Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 46, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 
31; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 47, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention (III) Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 13, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV) Relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 33, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Addi-
tional Protocol I, supra note 127, arts. 20, 51(6), 52(1), 53(c), 54(4), 55(2), 56(4); see also Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to 
be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) art. 3, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 
U.N.T.S. 168. 
130. See, e.g., COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 35, ¶ 6.2.4. 
131. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 50(1). 
132. Id. art. 50(2)(a). 
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responsible State has breached.133 Countermeasures infringing diplomatic 
or consular inviolability are also proscribed.134 As an example, cyber opera-
tions directed against an embassy’s computer system or that intercept en-
crypted diplomatic communications cannot qualify as countermeasures. 
This prohibition includes situations in which the precipitating internation-
ally wrongful act to which the countermeasure would respond was com-
mitted by a member of the diplomatic service or otherwise involves the 
abuse of diplomatic privileges. 135  Of course, States may always agree 
among themselves to exclude the possibility of countermeasures, usually 
by means of a treaty provision to the effect that countermeasures are una-
vailable with respect to the subject matter of the treaty or in certain cir-
cumstances set forth in the treaty.136 
D. Proportionality 
Countermeasures must, as reflected in Article 51 of the Articles on State 
Responsibility, be proportionate, that is, “commensurate with the injury 
suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act 
and the rights in question.”137 This principle was set forth in the 1928 
Naulilaa arbitration: “Même si l'on admettait que le droit des gens n'exige pas que la 
représaille se mesure approximativement à l'offense, on devrait certainement considérer, 
comme excessives et partant illicites, des représailles hors de toute proportion avec l'acte 
qui les a motivées.”138 A countermeasure that is disproportionate to the injury 
suffered amounts to punishment or reprisal and is therefore contrary to 
the object and purpose of the law governing countermeasures. Conse-
quently, its wrongfulness is not precluded. 
Proportionality in the context of countermeasures must be distin-
guished from jus ad bellum proportionality, which refers to the amount of 
                                                          
133. Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pak.), 1972 I.C.J. 46, ¶ 16 
(Aug. 18). 
134. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 50(2)(b); see also United States Diplomatic 
and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 61–62, 77, 86 (May 24) (Tehran Hostages); Vienna Con-
vention on Consular Relations arts. 33, 35, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
135. As the ICJ noted in the Tehran Hostages case, diplomatic law is a “self-contained regime.” Teh-
ran Hostages, 1980 I.C.J. at ¶ 86.  
136. See, e.g., Case C-5/94, The Queen v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food ex parte 
Hedley Lomas (Ir.) Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. I-2553. 
137 . Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 51; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 85 (Sept. 25). For a critical analysis of the subject, see Thomas M. 
Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 715, 738–42 (2008). 
138 . Responsabilité de l’Allemagne à Raison des Dommages Causés dans les Colonies 
Portugaises du Sud de l’Afrique (Port. v. Ger.) (Naulilaa Case), 2 R.I.A.A. 1011, 1028 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
1928) (unofficially translated as “[e]ven if one were to admit that the law of nations does not require 
that the reprisal be proportionate to the offense, one should certainly consider reprisals that are en-
tirely disproportionate to the act motivating them as being excessive and unlawful.”). 
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force required for a State to effectively defend itself against an armed at-
tack.139 In some self-defense situations, only measures that are dispropor-
tionate to the intensity and scope of the precipitating armed attack will 
suffice to pressure the attacking State into desisting; such measures are 
generally lawful. Proportionality in the law of self-defense equally limits a 
State’s defensive measures to those that are required to defeat the armed 
attack, even if they fall short of the intensity of the armed attack that pre-
cipitated them.  
By contrast, a countermeasure that is disproportionate to the injury suf-
fered is impermissible even if only an action of that intensity and scope 
would suffice to convince the responsible State to desist in its internation-
ally wrongful conduct. Moreover, a countermeasure may permissibly ex-
ceed the minimum intensity and scope necessary to force the responsible 
State into compliance with its legal obligation to the injured State, so long 
as it complies with the requirements of purpose and proportionality.140 In 
this regard, there is no procedural requirement that the injured State take 
measures to mitigate damage before taking countermeasures. Nor does the 
lack of mitigation affect the proportionality of the countermeasures in 
question. The absence of mitigation by the injured State, however, may 
bear on the calculation of damages for which the originator State is ulti-
mately held responsible. 
Countermeasures proportionality must also be distinguished from the 
concept of proportionality in international humanitarian law, which pro-
hibits an attack during an armed conflict when the expected collateral 
damage is excessive relative to the anticipated military advantage likely to 
result.141 Thus, whereas proportionality in humanitarian law considers the 
harm caused by the attack in light of the military gain, proportionality in 
the context of countermeasures gauges harm relative to the injury suffered. 
In other words, the focus of the former is on the military benefit gained, 
while that of the latter is on the injury suffered by the State taking the 
countermeasure. 
Subsequent decisions have adopted a slightly broader approach than 
that articulated in Naulilaa, one that dictates consideration of the right in-
volved, a notion incorporated textually in Article 51 of the Articles on 
State Responsibility. By this approach, appraisal of proportionality is not 
                                                          
139. On the requirements of proportionality and necessity in the jus ad bellum context, see Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) (Nicaragua), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
¶¶ 176, 194 (June 27); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Weapons), Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 41 (July 8); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶¶ 43, 73–74, 76 
(Nov. 6). Also see the discussion in TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 1, at 61–63. 
140. For an argument that this should not be the case, see Enzo Cannizzaro, The Role of Propor-
tionality in the Law of International Countermeasures, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 889 (2001). 
141. Additional Protocol I, supra note 127, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b). 
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merely a matter of quantitative comparison of consequences. The Air Ser-
vices Arbitral Tribunal explained,  
[I]t is essential, in a dispute between States, to take into account not 
only the injuries suffered by the companies concerned but also the 
importance of the questions of principle arising from the alleged 
breach. The Tribunal thinks that it will not suffice, in the present 
case, to compare the losses suffered by Pan Am on account of the 
suspension of the projected services with the losses which the 
French companies would have suffered as a result of the counter-
measures; it will also be necessary to take into account the im-
portance of the positions of principle which were taken when the 
French authorities prohibited changes of gauge in third countries. If 
the importance of the issue is viewed within the framework of the 
general air transport policy adopted by the United States Govern-
ment and implemented by the conclusion of a large number of in-
ternational agreements with countries other than France, the 
measures taken by the United States do not appear to be clearly 
disproportionate when compared to those taken by France. Neither 
Party has provided the Tribunal with evidence that would be suffi-
cient to affirm or reject the existence of proportionality in these 
terms, and the Tribunal must be satisfied with a very approximative 
appreciation.142 
The Tribunal therefore concluded that “judging the ‘proportionality’ of 
counter-measures is not an easy task and can at best be accomplished by 
approximation.”143  
To illustrate, consider the case of countermeasures that affect the in-
teroperability of the responsible State’s cyber communications systems. 
Not only will those effects factor into the proportionality assessment, but 
so too will the general principle in State practice that cyber communica-
tions systems should be operative across borders. The ICJ confirmed this 
approach in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros nearly five decades after the arbitral deci-
sion in Air Services.144  
                                                          
142. Air Serv. Agreement of 27 Mar. 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.) (Air Serv.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417, ¶ 83 (Perm. 
Ct. Arb. 1978). 
143. Id. 
144. See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶¶ 85–87 (Sept. 25). In do-
ing so, the Court looked to the Permanent Court of Justice’s judgment in Territorial Jurisdiction of 
the International Commission of the River Oder, (U.K., Czech, Den., Fr., Ger., Swed. v. Pol.), 1929 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 23, at 27 (Sept. 10). The Tallinn Manual suggests that Naulilaa and Gabčíkovo-
Nagymoros are different standards and that neither has yet achieved prominence. TALLINN MANUAL, 
supra note 1, at 38–39. The better view is that the latter builds on the former.  
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 The interconnected and interdependent nature of cyber systems may 
render it difficult to accurately determine the degree of damage that a 
countermeasure will likely cause. States will therefore have to exercise due 
care in assessing whether their actions will be proportionate to the injury 
suffered and principle involved. This may require, for instance, mapping 
the targeted system. Since due care is a contextual standard influenced by 
such factors as the severity of the harm suffered, the extent of further 
damage caused by any delay, the cyber capabilities of the injured State, and 
the responsible State’s vulnerabilities, it must be determined on a case-by-
case basis. 
Proportionality does not imply reciprocity; there is no requirement that 
the injured State’s countermeasures breach the same obligation violated by 
the responsible State. Nor is there any requirement that the countermeas-
ures be of the same nature as the underlying internationally wrongful act 
that justifies them. Non-cyber countermeasures may be used in response 
to a wrongful act involving cyber operations, and vice-versa. However, as a 
general matter, the requirement of proportionality is less likely to be 
breached, or at least to be assessed as having been breached, when the 
countermeasure is in kind.145  
Relatedly, there is no requirement of numerical congruency. A single in-
ternationally wrongful act by a responsible State may be responded to by 
countermeasures that would otherwise breach numerous obligations. An 
injured State may respond, for instance, to a single wrongful act with a se-
ries of different cyber countermeasures, none of which would alone be 
sufficient to impel the responsible State to desist, but which when com-
bined would do so. The sole question in such a case is whether the com-
bined countermeasures are proportionate to the injury suffered. 
E. Evidentiary Considerations 
Since countermeasures represent a form of self-help, the injured State 
will typically make the determination as to whether an international obliga-
tion has been breached and identify the originating State (or non-State ac-
tors). In the event that its assessment “turns out not to be well-founded,” 
the injured State’s action cannot qualify as a countermeasure. 146  The 
wrongfulness of the purported countermeasure would not be precluded 
and the injured State would itself incur responsibility for its response (and 
be subject to countermeasures). 
It is often difficult to attribute cyber activities to a particular State or ac-
tor with unqualified certainty. In particular, cyber operations can, as noted, 
                                                          
145. See COMMENTARIES, supra note 28, at 285–95. 
146. Id. at 285. 
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be designed to mask or spoof the originator. As an example, a State may 
take control of another State’s cyber infrastructure and use it to mount 
harmful operations against a third State to make the injured State conclude 
that the second State is responsible for them. The Commentary to the Arti-
cles on State Responsibility, citing the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 
has suggested that the standard for factual attribution is identification with 
“reasonable certainty.” 147 This standard would apply both to the identity 
of the originator and its association with a particular State. A cyber coun-
termeasure undertaken in a mistaken, but reasonable, belief as to the iden-
tity of the originator or place of origin will be lawful so long as all other 
requirements for countermeasures have been met. 
The reasonable certainty standard is no less relevant to omissions. Re-
call that States have a duty to stop harmful cyber activities emanating from 
their cyber infrastructure. In some cases, it may be impossible to attribute 
a cyber operation with reasonable certainty to a particular State, yet rea-
sonable certainty may have been achieved regarding the location(s) from 
which the attack has been launched. Should this be so, countermeasures 
might be appropriate against the State in question for its internationally 
wrongful failure to control cyber activities on its territory, albeit not based 
on attribution of the activities to that State. 
F. Originator and Target of Countermeasures 
Countermeasures are a tool reserved exclusively to States. They provide 
no legal basis under international law for private companies, such as an 
information technology firm, to act on their own initiative in responding 
to a harmful cyber operation. This is so even if such entities possess cyber 
capabilities that are robust, in some cases exceeding those of States. Thus, 
when Google reportedly hacked back in response to a penetration of the 
company’s system by a cyber gang, the operation could not be character-
ized as a countermeasure even though the group may have had ties to the 
Chinese government.148  
However, there is no prohibition on injured States turning to private 
companies, including foreign companies, to conduct operations on their 
behalf against responsible States.149  Of course, the injured State would 
bear responsibility for the company’s actions pursuant to the rules of at-
tribution discussed above. Further, a company conducting the cyber opera-
                                                          
147. Id. at 91, 93 (citing Yeager v. Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 92, 101–02 (1987)). 
148. David E. Sanger & John Markoff, After Google’s Stand on China, U.S. Treads Lightly, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/15/world/asia/15diplo.html?_r=0. 
149. On this issue, see Zach West, Young Fella, If You’re Looking for Trouble I’ll Accommodate You: 
Deputizing Private Companies for the Use of Hackback, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 119 (2012). 
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tions would be bound by all relevant restrictions and conditions on coun-
termeasures. Failure of the company to abide by them would preclude 
qualification of the operations as lawful countermeasures; in certain cir-
cumstances, it would also generate State responsibility for the company’s 
actions.  
Only injured States may engage in countermeasures.150 Two exceptions 
to this general principle exist. Pursuant to the Article 48(1) of the Articles 
on State Responsibility, 
[a]ny state other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the re-
sponsibility of another State . . . if: (a) [t]he obligation breached is 
owed to a group of States including that State, and is established for 
the protection of a collective interest of the group; or (b) [t]he obli-
gation breached is owed to the international community as a 
whole.151 
Subparagraph (a) refers to an obligation that is of a collective nature, as 
in a regional nuclear-free-zone treaty. Subparagraph (b) situations generally 
involve obligations erga omnes.152 Examples of the latter include the prohibi-
tions on aggression, genocide, and slavery.153 Acting on either of these two 
bases is subject to numerous restrictions.154 
States may not engage in countermeasures on behalf of another State. 
The ICJ addressed this issue in the Nicaragua case, where it noted  
The acts of which Nicaragua is accused, even assuming them to 
have been established and imputable to that State, could only have 
justified proportionate counter-measures on the part of the State 
                                                          
150. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) (Nicaragua), 
1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 249 (June 27). 
151. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 13, art. 48(1). Care must be taken to ensure the 
obligation in question is not merely hortatory in nature. For instance, the Final Acts of the World 
Conference on International Telecommunications at Dubai in 2012, which updated the International 
Telecommunications Regulations, imposes a hortatory duty on member States to “individually and 
collectively endeavour to ensure the security and robustness of international telecommunication 
networks in order to achieve effective use thereof and avoidance of technical harm thereto, as well as 
the harmonious development of international telecommunication services offered to the public.” 
INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, FINAL ACTS OF THE WORLD CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL TEL-
ECOMMUNICATIONS, art. 5A (2012), available at http://www.itu.int/en/wcit-12/Documents/final-ac 
ts-wcit-12.pdf. Although the obligation is owed to all members of the organization, none of the 
members may individually enforce it via countermeasures.  
152. On erga omnes obligations, see Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 
I.C.J. 3, ¶ 33 (Feb. 5).  
153. Id. ¶ 34; see also East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, ¶ 29 (June 30) (agreeing that the 
right to self-determination has an erga omnes character). 
154. See COMMENTARIES, supra note 28, at 277–78. 
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which had been the victim of these acts . . . . They could not justify 
counter-measures taken by a third state . . . .155  
Although there are a few examples of States that have not been injured 
taking actions that would appear to be countermeasures, particularly with 
respect to economic sanctions,156 the Commentary to the Articles on State 
Responsibility finds the State practice insufficient to support a norm allow-
ing one State to engage in countermeasures on behalf of another.157 This is 
a particularly important restriction in the context of both internationally 
wrongful cyber acts and cyber countermeasures, for it precludes an injured 
State that lacks the technical capabilities to engage in cyber countermeas-
ures from seeking the assistance of States possessing them. 
Countermeasures may not be “directed” against States other than the 
responsible State. In particular, a countermeasure conducted by one State 
against another that breaches a legal obligation owed by the former to a 
third State remains wrongful vis-à-vis the third State.158 For instance, a 
cyber countermeasure that blocks the traffic of the responsible State’s pri-
vate banking system might also negatively impact third States in a fashion 
that breaches obligations owed to those third States. The fact that the ac-
tions qualify as a countermeasure vis-à-vis the responsible State does not 
preclude its wrongfulness as to the others. In light of the networking of 
cyber systems across borders, the possibility of effects reverberating 
throughout trans-border networks can be high. When this occurs, the 
question is whether those effects violate legal duties owed to other States 
in which they manifest. 
As illustrated in the aforementioned example, the targets of the coun-
termeasures need not be State organs or State cyber infrastructure, alt-
hough States must be the “object” of the countermeasures. In the exam-
ple, assume that organs of the responsible State are conducting intrusions 
to alter data in order to precipitate a loss of confidence in the injured 
State’s private banking system. The injured State responds in kind. Since 
the responsible State has itself engaged in an internationally wrongful act, 
the cyber countermeasure is appropriate; the State is the object of the 
countermeasure, which is designed to put an end to its wrongful activity. 
                                                          
155. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 249. 
156. For instance, following the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, a number of States, including 
the United States, froze Iraqi assets. Exec. Order No. 12,722, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,803 (Aug. 3, 1990). See 
also examples set forth in COMMENTARIES, supra note 28, at 302–04. 
157. COMMENTARIES, supra note 28, at 305. Views on the subject appeared to evolve over the 
course of the deliberations of the International Law Commission. See Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, 
Countermeasures in Response to Grave Violations of Obligations Owed to the International Community, in THE 
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1137 (James Crawford et al. ed., 2010). 
158. COMMENTARIES, supra note 28, at 285. See also, e.g., Corn Prods. Int’l, Inc. v. United Mexican 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01, Decision on Responsibility, ¶ 176 (Jan. 15, 2008). 
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On the other hand, assume that a private firm in the first State is engaging 
in harmful cyber operations against a competitor in the second State. In 
such a case, it would be inappropriate to launch countermeasures against 
the firm unless its action could be attributed to the first State or that State 
has wrongfully failed to control the activities of the bank.  
G. Location of Countermeasures 
The location from which a cyber countermeasure is launched by an in-
jured State does not bear on its lawfulness. Of course, if launched from a 
third State, the activity may violate obligations owed to that State, but that 
fact would not preclude it from qualifying as a lawful countermeasure with 
respect to the responsible State. Additionally, the lawfulness of a cyber 
countermeasure against the responsible State is not affected by the loca-
tion of cyber infrastructure through which it passes (again, absent a specif-
ic obligation to the contrary). After all, countermeasures are lawful in na-
ture, even though they would have been unlawful but for the underlying 
conduct of the responsible State. This is so even when the territory of a 
third State is involved because the countermeasure is not “harmful” as a 
matter of law, and, therefore, does not implicate the obligation to take ac-
tion to terminate harmful activities emanating from that State’s territory. 
Of course, if allowing the cyber countermeasure to be launched from, or 
through, the third State’s territory would violate another specific obligation 
the third State owed the responsible State, such as a mutual cyber security 
agreement, the acquiescence would constitute an internationally wrongful 
act.  
CONCLUSION 
The prevailing sense that States stand defenseless in the face of mali-
cious cyber activities that do not qualify as “armed attacks” endangers in-
ternational peace and security. In particular, it incentivizes treating such 
operations as armed attacks in order to justify a response by the injured 
State. Since an armed attack opens the door to forceful defensive reac-
tions, the likelihood of escalation is thereby exacerbated.  
This unfortunate perception is not merely destabilizing; it is 
counternormative. Countermeasures offer States a viable, and lawful, 
means of responding to harmful cyber actions in a manner more robust 
than retorsion, but less provocative than a use of force. With counter-
measures, States will seldom be left with a choice between ineffective re-
sponse and overreaction. 
Countermeasures, however, are no panacea. They are subject to im-
portant restrictions. Most significant among these is the limitation of coun-
termeasures, in contrast to actions in self-defense, to internationally 
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wrongful acts attributable to States. Thus, in the case of cyber operations 
launched by non-State actors, the international wrongfulness of an injured 
State’s response will not be precluded unless a separate breach by the State 
to which the injured State’s obligations are owed can be identified. Moreo-
ver, in such a case, proportionality will be measured against that breach, 
not the severity of the non-State actor’s operations.  
A related restriction is that only States may take countermeasures. Pri-
vate entities, such as information technology companies, may possess the 
capability to mount effective countermeasures to protect themselves, but 
they may not employ them for that purpose except at the behest of a State 
and in order to enforce an obligation owed that State by another State un-
der international law. This is a particularly problematic constraint for ma-
jor multinational corporations operating from States that lack the technical 
wherewithal to effectively respond to cyber activities directed at cyber in-
frastructure on their territory.  
The limitation to unilateral action further restricts the potential effec-
tiveness of countermeasures. In many cases, the injured State may be una-
ble to respond, yet enjoy friendly relations with other States that possess 
the means, and that would be willing to come to the former’s assistance. 
Yet, unlike collective defense, the law of State responsibility does not ad-
mit of collective countermeasures. Other restrictions, such as proportion-
ality and purpose, further temper the scope of the resort to countermeas-
ures. 
Finally, the restriction of countermeasures to non-forceful actions pre-
sents a particular problem in the cyber context. It has the consequence of 
leaving a State facing cyber uses of force that do not rise to the armed at-
tack level unable to respond in kind. The uncertainty as to where the two 
thresholds lie with respect to cyber operations complicates matters.  
This conundrum is likely to lead to one of two results. One possibility is 
that States will embrace Judge Simma’s position in the Oil Platforms case, so 
as to be able to respond to unlawful cyber uses of force with their own 
forceful cyber operations not reaching the armed attack level.159 Of course, 
such a norm would apply equally in the non-cyber context, thereby remov-
ing the speed bump between countermeasures and forceful action repre-
sented by the use of force-armed attack gap. Alternatively, States could 
adopt the U.S. approach, by which all uses of force qualify as armed at-
tacks against which the injured State may respond forcefully. While this 
would give States a means of responding effectively to cyber uses of force 
that would otherwise not reach the armed attack level, it would, like the 
                                                          
159. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 333 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion of Judge 
Simma). 
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first approach, weaken the conditions precedent for employing force. This 
might be particularly concerning for States like the United States that wield 
significant cyber capabilities, for it would open the door to forceful re-
sponses to their operations. 
Despite these limitations, it is clear that the existence of countermeas-
ures as a response option to internationally wrongful cyber acts enables 
injured States to safeguard their interests without unnecessarily risking es-
calation. Moreover, the fact that countermeasures may be taken by cyber 
means widens the range of response options in the face of non-cyber in-
ternationally wrongful acts. The greater the range and scope of possible 
responses, assuming they are properly and wisely employed, the less likely 
a situation involving international tension is to deteriorate further. States 
would be well-advised to carefully consider the prospects for using coun-
termeasures to respond to “below the threshold” cyber operations and to 
begin developing procedures and rules of engagement for their employ-
ment.  
